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McDonald’s in Vietnam 
In February 2014, McDonald’s opened its first restaurant in 
Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC), Vietnam. As the eighth-most 
populous country in Southeast Asia, Vietnam was the sec-
ond-to-last middle-income country in Asia without a Mc-
Donald’s presence. Business specialists speculated that the 
fast food company, which received 68% of its total revenues 
of $27.57 billion from overseas markets as of 2012, opened 
the HCMC franchise in response to declining sales in oth-
er Asian markets -- particularly China and Japan. McDon-
alds’ expansion into Vietnam followed that of other popular 
American brands including Pizza Hut and Burger King. The 
arrival of such international franchises are an indication of 
Vietnam’s growing economic vibrancy and a result of increas-
ing foreign investment in the Southeast Asian country.
Foreign Interests in Vietnam
Vietnam is an attractive prospect for foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) given its position as a net exporter and its healthy 
economy with high internal consumption. The country’s po-
litical and social stability, young population, and geographic 
location positions Vietnam at a competitive advantage for 
FDI. However, the reliance on patronage and personal rela-
tionships with members of the ruling party remains essential 
for both domestic and foreign investors to conduct business 
in the country’s promising economy. While an attractive pros-
pect for FDI, the lack of administration and laws adequate for 
competitive markets pose a serious problem for Vietnam.
All in the Family?
Political theorists and economists alike found the HCMC 
McDonald’s franchise of particular interest for another rea-
son – in its opening the restaurant associated with Henry 
Nguyen, the son-in-law of Vietnam’s Prime Minister Nguyen 
Tan Dung. McDonald’s move to partner with Henry Nguyen 
incited speculation by both the Vietnamese and global public 
that perhaps crony capitalism, where Nguyen’s familial ties 
and linkages with the government, rather than Nguyen’s ed-
ucation and professional experience, led to his  ownership of 
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the popular franchise.
McDonald’s assured the public that Nguyen’s appointment 
was due to his business expertise and company loyalty. Nguy-
en had, after all, worked for years as a McDonald’s employee 
while Harvard University, before going on to earn business 
and medical degrees from Northwestern University and work 
on Wall Street. McDonald’s asserted that the combination of 
Nguyen’s restaurant experience, and his work in the private 
sector, positioned him as the logical choice to own and oper-
ate the Vietnamese franchise. McDonald’s vice president for 
corporate relations confirms that, “the contract with Henry 
Nguyen as developmental licensee (was) the result of a rigor-
ous selection process that began years ago.”
Despite these statements from McDonald’s, however, the Viet-
namese public viewed Henry Nguyen’s appointment as a con-
tinuation of the current ruling party’s affinity for nepotism. A 
pattern of party leaders appointing family members to top ex-
ecutive positions was commonplace in the “patronage-fuelled 
business culture” of Vietnam and McDonald’s was seen as just 
another normal business.
Understanding Crony Capitalism in Vietnam: A Look at its 
Political and Economic History 
Corruption in Vietnam, and the lack of legal consequences 
and accountability deterred foreign investors to Vietnam af-
ter the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Joint ventures remain the 
most common way for foreign businesses to begin operations 
in Vietnam. The equitization program- “the word ‘privatize’ is 
still politically suspect”- forced state owned enterprises (SOE) 
to limit the size of their workforce to allow for possible joint 
ventures.  Despite a series of legal addendums following ad-
mission to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and Associ-
ation of Southeast Asian Nations, foreigners can have no more 
than a 49% share in any local business.  While joint ventures 
represent a gradual mechanism for greater economic integra-
tion, they are still considered a risky endeavor for the CPV. 
Effective functioning of any joint venture requires party sup-
port; “Corporations have been free to form joint ventures with 
foreign partners and sell stakes to overseas investors- just so 
long as the management, as a whole, does the Party’s bidding. 
In return, they get access to preferential government support.”
Vietnam’s Outlook
Vietnam is following suit of its Asian neighbors whereby eco-
nomic growth is given precedence over democratic institu-
tions. Unfortunately, underdeveloped democratic institutions 
have enabled the persistence of crony capitalism and nepotism. 
In the name of economic planning, ruling party members of-
ten hold excessive power in the decision making of industries 
and businesses. Political scientists such as Francis Fukuyama 
blamed “unique Asian systems” -- including widespread crony 
capitalism -- as a cause of the 1997 financial crisis and a major 
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it is easier to manage with an authoritarian government but 
an authoritarian government is equally likely to ensure that it 
holds a financial stake in all Vietnamese business transactions. 
Rather than amending laws that encourage competitive mar-
kets, in 2012, the CPV began a “criticism and self-criticism” 
campaign to address shortcomings among the leadership 
and strengthen the party’s legitimacy in Vietnam. In October 
2012, the Prime Minister apologized publicly to the National 
Assembly for mishandling state coffers. The government also 
arrested several wealthy individuals closely associated with 
Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung for “illegal business activi-
ties” and “economic crimes.” However, the value of these “re-
forms” remains in question, as the arrests were also considered 
a power play engineered by the Prime Minister’s rivals. The 
actual causes of Vietnam’s economic slowdown may require 
further, deeper reforms to increase openness, transparency, 
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obstacle to continuing high levels of economic growth in the 
region. 
Vietnam has enacted other reforms that it hopes will promote 
equitable economic growth and limit corruption. These poli-
cies include reducing permit requirements, simplifying com-
pany establishment procedures, and the establishment of ‘one-
stop-shops,’ or businesses that offer a plethora of services. The 
Global Competitiveness Report of 2012 reflected these reforms 
to some extent in the Vietnam’s improved performance num-
bers, but according to the business community, Vietnamese 
authorities still frequently change regulations without prior 
notice and often apply these regulations in an opaque manner.
Thus the current system still strongly relies on patronage and 
personal relationships with members of the ruling party. Pri-
vate companies – both domestic and foreign – are willing to 
pay large fees to obtain introductions to the family members 
of the CPV elite. Even mission-driven organizations such as 
the World Bank allow CPV leaders to set loan terms and con-
ditions in order to conduct work in Vietnam. 
   
The public has expressed “widespread [...] grievances” over 
issues involving living standards, wealth inequality, land sei-
zures, corruption, and cronyism in Vietnam. The anonymity 
of the Internet has allowed critics to skirt tight media controls 
and disclose scandals of crony capitalism to the public. Yet, 
for the most part, CPV leaders maintain control over dissent 
and have resisted calls to improve political rights. The country 
experiences small-scale protests from several interest groups 
-- mostly connected to land-use rights, political liberalization, 
and dispute resolution mechanisms.
Vietnam is currently a negotiating member of the Trans Pacif-
ic Partnership (TPP), a large-scale free trade agreement that 
would reduce trade barriers among countries on both sides of 
the Pacific Ocean. For Vietnam, it offers a great opportunity to 
liberalize its economy by limiting the power of SOEs. Because 
SOEs offer a high share of tax revenues, domestic tariffs have 
persisted in Vietnam. While the removal of tariffs is seen as an 
encouraging sign for job creation and more equitable business 
management, the case of McDonald’s shows that the presence 
of foreign companies is hardly a sign of lessening crony capi-
talism and corrupt business practices. 
Scholars suggest that the willingness of other countries to ac-
cept Vietnam in the TPP despite the fact that it is partially 
a state controlled economy “speaks to the seriousness of the 
government about reform and may also demonstrate that eco-
nomic reform is easier to do in authoritarian states.” This shows 
the paradoxical nature of economic liberalization in Vietnam; 
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